Hearsay Statements of Child Victims

In a case that will impact a large number of child molestation cases, the Supreme Court of Ohio placed a limit on the type of "hearsay" statements of children that a prosecutor may present at child molestation trial. "Hearsay" is when person A comes to court and testifies about what person B said on a previous occassion. Most hearsay statements are prohibited from being admitted at trial - but some very specific types are. In State v. Arnold, the Ohio Supreme Court stated that only some of the hearsay statements of child victims come in at trial - those that a child states to a medical professional for medical purposes. Child victims are often interviewed by medical professionals in the context of a police investigation in order to assess their injuries. These are the type of hearsay statements that a prosecutor may use at trial - an essentially no others. This ruling will require police and prosecutors to be much more careful about who asks questions and what topics those persons cover during interviews of child victims. Regardless of what non-legal types may presume, these are always awful cases to investigate and defend - and this ruling makes the rules about how these uncomfortable cases are presented at trial.

Texting at Work is No Longer Always Private

In one of the more closely watched U.S. Supreme Court cases involving emerging technology in some time, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a decision involving what is easily becoming one of the most often used methods of communication: text messaging. In City of Ontario v. Quon, the Court held that text messages sent on a text device issued and paid for by a governmental employer (in this case, the City of Ontario, California), are not nessarily private and can be possibly read by the employer. Although this is the first case where the Court actually dealt with what is now this common form of communication, the decision was very fact specific (the U.S. Supreme Court is often very careful to select cases where the particular facts will result in a very narrow ruling - as they did here). The Court based its decision on an analysis of the Fourth Amendment, and whether the search of the text messages was "reasonable" - using many of the same factors it uses in determining whether other searches violate the Constitution: was the search legitimate, was the search reasonable and limited in scope. In this case, the City handed out personal messaging devices to its workers, called a meeting to put limits on their use, and told the workers that their e-messages are going to be monitored - so the Court felt that under these circumstances there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Court was hesitant to issue a broader technology-based opinion given, in their opinion, how quickly and often technology changes. The Court stated:

"Rapid changes inthe dynamics of communication and information transmission areevident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts asproper behavior. At present, it is uncertain how workplace norms,and the law’s treatment of them, will evolve."

As a pratical matter, we are not sure how this opinion specifically applies to (1) the private workplace and (2) governmental workplaces were "big brother" overly monitors everything - and we think that the Court wanted it that way. Nevertheless, any employer, both private and governmental, should have clearly defined "reasonable" text and email policies in place in order to prevent any employee from claiming that their rights have been violated, and all employees should either have their own communications device or assume that what they put on their employer's device can and will be read by the employer.

The Big Police Speeding Case

Last week, the news and printed media reported extensively about the Ohio Supreme Court's holding that police officers can pull someone over (and prosecutors can convict if necessary) by using, essentially, their visual estimate of speed. In Barberton v. Jenny, the Ohio Supreme Court said it was constitutionally permissible to have an officer with the proper amount of training and certification to competently testify about a driver's rate of speed - without the necessity of a radar or laser gun or without the use of a technique called "pacing" (where the officer follows a driver for a certain distance "pacing" his or her speed) or airplane spotting. The Court said there was no constitutional prohibition on this visual estimate as long as the officer had the necessary training and certification. The Supreme Court of Ohio overruled the position held by the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, and has issued a decision that is not setting very well with the general public. As a practical matter, most police departments will not use this method of speed detection. The writer of this blog has yet to speak to a single police officer who says they intend on trying this new method out. Ohio stock in laser and radar equipment may take a dive if this method becomes popular.

Barry Bonds and Lab Results

In a recent case out of the federal Ninth District Court of Appeals, a federal appeals court held that the federal government is not permitted to merely submit blood and urine lab reports and present hearsay testimony of a lab employee - instead of presenting the actual person (Bond's trainer Greg Anderson) to whom Bonds gave his blood and urine samples. Given the fact that Mr. Sanderson invoked his Fifth Amendment right to not testify (he may have imlicated himself in a crime too), the Government was faced with having to have just the lab employee testify and have the lab results introduced as a sort of replacement for the testimony of Sanderson. However, the Court in United States v. Bonds stated that this was hearsay, and the Government could not use this method instead of the testimony of Mr. Sanderson. It is now assumed that the Government will have a much more difficult time in their ongoing prosecution of Mr. Bonds. We'll have to see what happens next.

Sex Abuse and Repressed Memories

The Ohio Supreme Court recently made still another pronoucement that Ohio Courts will not invade the intent of the Ohio General Assembly when it passess legislation. The Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear in a number of its decisions in the last 5 years that it will strictly enforce statutes enacted by the Ohio Generally Asembly - and refuse to apply any interpretation not specfically set forth in those statutes - what some folks call "activists judges." Effective Aug. 3, 2006, the General Assembly enacted R.C. 2305.111(C), which created a 12-year statute of limitation for persons who had been molested while they were under the age of 18. Essentially, once a person reached the age of 18, they had to remember any repressed memories of being molested, and then sue the legally liable person(s), before they reached the age of 30 (i.e. 18 years plus the 12 years). In Pratte v. Stewart, the Ohio Supreme Court made it clear that even a person who legitimately had repressed memories beyond their 30th birthday could not sue their attacker because that person had not rembered and sued before their 30th birthday. The Court said that since the new statute did not provide for any exceptions, they would not create one. Although this case invovled the statute of limintations on child molestation cases, it appears for the time being that the Ohio Supreme Court has taken a very strict "separation-of-powers" position - saying that if the Ohio General Assembly has not enacted a specific law, then that law essentially does not exist. This judicial philosphy is something we will be monitorings in the future.

New Changes in Ohio Traffic Rules

Effective January 1, 2010, Ohio has modified some of the rules that effect how traffic citations and traffic court cases can or must proceed. Michael O'Shea is a part-time City Prosecutor for the City of Rocky River, and he recently gave a summary presentation of these amendments to the rules to all of his fellow city prosecutors from other cities in Cuyahoga County. First, the Ohio Uniform Traffic Ticket (the ticket form used by police to write all tickets- even DUI tickets) has been modified to include a place for an officer to write down prior DUI offenses (if it applies), and the ticket no longer will include all portions of the social security number of the defendant (in order to preserve identity information for each defendant).

Second, now a defendant can post bond when a ticket is written, and instead of coming back to court, that bond, with the permission of the defendant, can be applied to pay all fines and costs in the absence of the defendant. In this way, an out of state defendant does not have to travel back to the Ohio court from where the ticket issues. Some parts of the amended rules even allow a defendant to plea, as it is called "in abstentia," even when it comes to DUI offenses - as long as the judge and the prosecutor agree. You may begin to see some police forces and traffic courts require all out-of-the-area traffic defendants to post larger bonds - even for minor traffic offenses.

Third, courts are now permitted to arraign and take pleas from traffic defendants by giving a general speech (in writing or otherwise) to the entire group of defendants in the courtroom - rather than having to essentially give the same speech to each defendant individually. This will allow large number traffic arraignments and pleas to move along much more quickly.

These amendments are designed to address some of the problems that have slowed down the traffic courts for years.

Improper Use of Prior DUIs in Subsequent Prosecutions

The Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion that bars the use of prior DUI and driving-under-suspension ("DUS") convictions if the purpose of the prior DUI and DUS convictions is to support a claim that the defendant was intoxicated in the current prosecution. In the case of State v. Greer, the prosecution attempted to use the fact that the defendant had been previously convicted of a number of other DUI and DUS crimes - but only did so because the prosecution had no medical evidence of the current alleged driving while intoxicated event. The Court held that where the defendant claims that he was not intoxicated at all, the State cannot use the prior DUI and DUS cases to prove that he was. Most prosecutors would have never put this one to the test. So this decision is not surprising.

What Exactly Does a "No Contest" Plea Mean?

The Ohio Supreme Court has recently made it clear that if a defendant enters a "no contest" plea in a criminal case (and is found guilty as almost all are after they enter the plea), the fact that the defendant entered that plea (and the resulting conviction) cannot be used in any subsequent civil case. No contest pleas are often entered by defendants in criminal cases rather than "guilty" pleas. These "no contest" pleas are seen by many defendants as a softer version of a guilty plea, and some courts had held that Ohio law also barred the use of a "no contest" plea in a subsequent civil action involving the defendant (for example, where the defendant is sued for the damage the defendant did in his criminal actions). In Elevators Mut. Ins. Co. v. J. Patrick O’Flaherty’s, Inc., the Ohio Supreme Court made it clear once and for all that "no contest" pleas cannot be used in subsequent civil cases involving the same activity by the defendant. The Court reasoned that: "“The purpose behind the inadmissibility of no contest pleas in subsequent proceedings is to encourage plea bargaining as a means of resolving criminal cases by removing any civil consequences of the plea. ... The rule also protects the traditional characteristic of the no contest plea, which is to avoid the admission of guilt. The prohibition against admitting evidence of no contest pleas was intended generally to apply to a civil suit by the victim of the crime against the defendant for injuries resulting from the criminal acts underlying the plea." This decision resolved a number of conflicting decisions for the lower courts of appeals. We assume we will see much more use of the no "contest plea" in the future.

Our Recent Success with Ohio Court of Appeals in a Lead Poisoning Case

One of the areas where we regularly concentrate our practice is in the area of lead poisoning. We often have to deal with a number of ongoing defenses and appeals by landlords and their lawyers in the processing of these claims. One of Cuyahoga County's biggest landlords is the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority ("CMHA"). CMHA is suppose to provide safe residential housing for low income persons and families. However, many children living at CMHA owned units regularly get poisoned by deteriorating lead paint - lead paint that Ohio and federal law require not be in a deteriorating state. Notwithstanding the fact that the Ohio Supreme Court has made it clear that the doctrine of "sovereign immunity" (i.e. the doctrine that says cities, counties and the State of Ohio, for the most part, cannot be sued for negligence) does not apply to injuries that occur in buildings or on grounds of governmental buildings, CMHA attempted to argue that they were immune for any lead poisoning injuries to small children. However, the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals rejected that argument in Bozeman v. CMHA and held that CMHA does have to defend cases involving lead poisoning injuries. The case is now back at the trial court for further proceedings. Once again, stay tuned for details.

Our Recent White Collar Defense Case

We recently got done (for now) with a white collar defense case where the Federal Government alleged that a former attorney had engaged in what is called a "Ponzi Scheme." Many hours went into the review of thousands of pages of tax, bank and other financial documents which the Government claimed supported their case. Dealing with the Federal Government can be complicated - but dealing with the prosecution by the Federal Government of a lawyer is very complicated. Lot's of personality. Anyway, on the date of trial, we and the Federal Government were ready to get the trial started, but the client/lawyer got wedding day jitters and did not show for trial. The Government's agents are currently looking for our client, so his case is not yet over. Once again, stay tuned for details.

Ohio Supreme Court Declares New Workers' Compensation Statute Constitutional

In what has been an ongoing battle at the Supreme Court of Ohio for the last decade or more, the Supreme Court of Ohio has found the newest version of the "intentional tort" section of the Workers' Compensation statute to be constitutional. In Kaminski v. Metal & Wire Products Co. the Court held that the General Assembly's most recent version of a law that gives greater protection to employers is, notwithstanding the holdings of previous panels of the Supreme Court of Ohio, constitutional. In Ohio, in order for an employee to sue an employer that causes an on-the-job injury to the employee, the employee, under the new law, must prove that the employer acted “with a deliberate intent to cause injury.” If the employee cannot prove that, then, regardless of the employer's negligence or the employee's injury, the employee is regulated to whatever he/she can get paid by the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. This ruling is the latest stage of an ongoing battle between forces who want to make it harder to sue employers for serious and reckless workplace injuries and those who believe that taking away an employee's right to sue for serious and reckless workplace injuries is a violation of the Ohio Constitutional "trial by jury" clause. The ongoing debate has to do with whether allowing more protection for employers will, in essence, indirectly encourage more injuries or death. We see this as just another stage of what will most likely be an endless battle between the forces behind business interests and the forces behind worker protection. Stay tuned - and be extra careful at work.

Must a Juror Be Able to Hear to Decide

The Ohio Supreme Court has recently decided that generally jurors' senses must be unimpaired to take in the specific evidence in order to be selected for that trial. Regardless of the fact that well intentioned society rules require that we respect and work with all types of persons with physical disabilities, if a physical impairment interferes with a juror's ability to take in the specific type of evidence that is presented in a particular trial, that juror must be excluded from that trial. In the case of State v. Speer,
the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that when the specific evidence in a trial requires that a juror have the senses necessary to take in that evidence, then the trial court must exclude any juror who has a physical impairment that interferes with taking in that evidence. In Speer, the jury had to hear and interpret 911 tapes, and one juror had a hearing disability, and the Supreme Court of Ohio had to reverse the conviction of the defendant because that juror could not properly hear the tapes.

Still more on arbitration provisions

We have previously reported to you about the potential dangers of "arbitration" provisions in what can generally be referred to as "consumer contracts" (i.e. contracts that involve the consuming general public like auto repairs, home-improvement, retail purchases, health care and nursing home services). Arbitration provisions have historically been found in many "commercial" contracts where the parties are mainly sophisticated business persons. However, in recent years, many companies which provide consumer services have placed arbitration provisions in their standard contracts in order to bar a consumer's right to bring a lawsuit for a breach of the contract - and even for personal injuries incurred by the negligence of those companies. These provisions essentially take the law out of the dispute and instead replace the law with the attitudes, opinion and sometime the biases of the arbitrators. Further, arbitrators charge huge fees for their "private" services while courts and judges provide all of their services for almost no charge at all other than a nominal filing fee.

Recent efforts in Congress have been aimed at barring arbitration provisions in all consumer contracts. For instance, if the negligence of an automaker or nursing home kills someone, any provision in contacts covering that relationship which mandate arbitration only for ANY dispute (including but not limited to personal injury claims) will be illegal. In fact, there is push in Congress to pass the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 this year. The act would ban mandatory arbitration in all consumer and employment disputes. Stay tuned for this development, and - again- review all of the contacts that you sign to see if there are any arbitration provisions buried in the small print.

Our Victory at the Supreme Court of Ohio

Last week we received word that we were completely victorious in our currently pending appeal with the Supreme Court of Ohio. In Beckett v. Warren, the Supreme Court of Ohio agreed with our claim that a person who has been injured by a dog attack can pursue and go to trial on BOTH a statutory claim for damages and a general negligence claim. This is important for dog attack victims because it permits them to obtain punitive damages against the dog owners if the injured party can prove that the dog in question had attacked a person prior to them. The Supreme Court sanctioned a new trial for the young girl in this case who had had her scalp torn from her head by a Rottweiler who had attacked another person just a few weeks earlier. Stay tuned for details on what happens when the case is set for a new trial at the trial court. Congrats to the family of this girl who have had to suffer for years with this terrible injury.

Cell Phone Search Warrant - a Must

In what could be one of the most functionally important criminal justice decisions of the year, the Ohio Supreme Court of Ohio today issued a search and seizure opinion on how and when police departments can search for cell phone data. In State v. Smith, the Court essentially held that the police must obtain a search warrant if they want to search the contents of a cell phone they have seized from an arrested person. This is somewhat of a refinement or distinction on the "search-incident-to-arrest" concept that allows the police to search a person or that person's car (and closed containers in that car) after that person has been arrested. The Court stated that given the "unique nature" of modern cell phones, they are more akin to a laptop computer (which clear case law says requires a search warrant) than closed containers found in a car (which clear case law says does not require a search warrant). This case will not prevent police from eventually searching a cell phone if they really want to, because all they will have to do is obtain a quick search warrant (very easy to do these days) and THEN search the phone. Further, remember that police can also obtain a call history by issuing a properly prepared subpoena or search warrant to the cell phone service provider (e.g. Verizon, AT&T, Sprint). Thought: If you are going to be involved in a criminal enterprise, delete all of that incriminating data on the phone in case you are arrested.

The Interest Rate in Contracts

The Ohio Supreme Court issued another business litigation decision this past week concerning the interest rate that a company or person must pay when they fail to pay on a contractual obligation. The case of Mayer v. Medancic concentrated on whether that interest rate can be a "simple" interest rate or an interest rate that allows for the "compounding" of interest. If it is a "simple" interest rate, then all the unpaid amount generates is interest only. If it is a "compounding" interest rate, then interest runs on the original unpaid amount - plus the previously unpaid and accrued interest. For example, if the unpaid amount is $10,000.00, and the contract between the parties just states that the interest rate is 8% (i.e. it does not specify whether or not it is a simple interest rate or a compounding interest charge), then the unpaid amount generates only $800.00 in interest per year. However, if the contract in this example specifically states that the interest rate on the unpaid amount is 8% to be compounded annually, then at the end of each year, the $800.00 interest incurred is added to the $10,000.00 principal, and 8% interest thereafter is earned on a now increased principal amount of $10,800.00. Obviously, a written agreement that calls for a compounding interest rate is going to generate a much larger overall amount of interest than a written agreement that either specifically calls for a simple interest rate or is silent on the matter. Suggestion, read your contacts and loan agreements very carefully on how interest is to be charged if a party defaults - especially of the compounding language calls for the interest to be compounded quarterly or even monthly.
It must also be pointed out that the interest rate statute has a number of specific provisions on what the statutory or limited interest rate may be for any specific written agreement. The amount of interest rate to be charged under the statute can very depending on what type of written document is involved. That topic is for another post and is not specifically discussed here.

The Spousal Privilege - Revisited

The Ohio Supreme Court has issued a new opinion involving a doctrine the law calls "spousal privilege." The old doctrine basically holds that a wife cannot testify against her husband in a court of law unless the husband permits her to do so (and, further, that a husband cannot testify against his wife in a court of law unless the wife permits him to do so) - if that testimony involves "confidential communications." For example, if a husband tells his wife in confidence that he committed a crime, the prosecutor cannot compel that wife to testify against the husband at trial about that confidential conversation. In this example, it is the husband who gets to determine whether to invoke the privilege - not the wife. In this most recent opinion (State v. Perez), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that while a wife may not testify against her husband in a criminal trial, any tape recordings of those conversations may be played for the the jury at trial. The Court held that this technical bypass of the privilege was, essentially, OK with them. After all, said the Court, the wife did not testify - the prosecution just played the tapes. Suggestion, check the room for bugs when planning a crime in the presence of your wife.

Subrogation - Again

We think that "subrogation" is such an important concept in the personal injury field, that we have decided to re-publish our original post on this subject, and then give you some more information on the concept. First, our original post is reprinted below:

When a person receives medical services as a result of an accident, the medical providers and/or the medical bill payors (e.g. medical insurance companies, Medicaid, Medicare, or Worker’s Compensation) almost always have what the law calls a “subrogation” claim on any monies that the injured person may end up collecting from the negligent party. In short, if the injured party gets compensated for the injury, the subrogation concept is that they essentially must pay these entities back for the medical bills or medical bills payments made by these entities. This subrogation area of personal injury law gets more complicated each day, with state statutes and federal statutes and medical insurance contracts getting more involved. Plaintiffs (and their lawyers) must be very careful to protect the subrogation interests of these entities – or they themselves can get sued in connection with the personal injury claim. It is very important for the client and the lawyer to identify and monitor the subrogation issues in the claim so there are no surprises when or after the client finally receives compensation.

Second, some more things to think about.

Medicare laws now in effect on the issue of subrogation have gotten even more complicated. Now, if you are injured in an accident, and you are getting ready to settle that accident, you and your medical providers have to use your best guess as to what medical bills you will, in the future, incur - and do your best to put aside settlement money to cover those costs. If you don't, Medicare can essentially sue both you and your lawyer for not doing so. So, before you settle any personal injury case where some or all of your medical bills have been paid by Medicare, be very careful to stay in full dialogue with the proper officials at Medicare about what they and your (and your lawyer) can agree will be the FUTURE medical costs likely to be paid by Medicare.

Further, some private health insurance companies actually hire professional subrogation companies to monitor the subrogation issues associated with a person's injury, and these subrogation companies will track you and your lawyer down to make sure that the health insurance company gets as much of its money back as it can. Most health insurance contracts that cover the relationship between a patient and the health insurance company require the patient to fully notify and cooperate with these professional subrogation companies. Again, like Medicare, if you or your lawyer ignore these subrogation issues, the professional subrogation companies can sue you to get the money the health insurance company was contractually entitled to.

Further still, subrogation law allows public health insurance companies like Medicaid and Medicare (and even some private health insurance companies) to actually have a direct claim against a defendant for the medical bills already paid by them. So, some defendants (and their lawyers) in personal injury claims will insist that they place both the client's and the health insurance/public insurance company's name on the check when a case is settled in order to assure themselves that they can't later be sued by the public or private health insurance provider.

Complicated enough for ya? We live this these issues every day.

Damaging the Phone While Someone is Calling 911

The Ohio Supreme Court decided that if someone damages or otherwise interrupts the attempted electronic contact with the police or fire department, they can be prosecuted and convicted for "Disrupting Public Service" - which is a felony.

In State v. Robinson, 2009-Ohio-5937, the Court held that if that "conduct substantially impairs the ability of law-enforcement officers, firefighters, rescue personnel, emergency-medical-services personnel, or emergency-facility personnel to respond to an emergency or to protect and preserve any person or property from serious physical harm," then the person causing the damage can be prosecuted and convicted of that statute.

This situation comes up most often when one person snatches the phone from another person trying to call 911 and damages the phone or the phone line. The defendant in that case had tried to argue that the statute can only apply when the actions of the a defendant shut down or interfere with an entire phone system - rather than just one phone.

However, the Supreme Court of Ohio rejected that argument and held that just damaging one phone is enough for a conviction.

If someone is calling the cops over what can only be a misdemeanor, the damaging of the phone to prevent or interfere with that call transforms the whole incident into a felony.

So don't smash the phone - just sit and wait for the cops or walk away.

More on Arbitration Agreements

We have previously brought you updates on the area of law involving arbitration agreements. As you may recall (or already know), contracts can contain clauses or provisions which require the parties to submit to arbitration if a dispute arises about the contact. While the debate on whether these clauses are a good idea rages on, the Ohio Supreme Court continues to issue opinions on how these arbitration provisions work. In its most recent opinion, the Court, in Mynes v. Brooks, 2009-Ohio-5946, held that if one party sues another over a contact which has an arbitration provision, and one party to that lawsuit files a motion to have the lawsuit suspended so that arbitration can resolve the dispute, either the "non-moving" party or the "moving" party has the right to appeal that decision immediately. Essentially, that means that the neither the moving party or the non-moving party has to wait until the whole lawsuit is over in order to present their issue to the court of appeals. In short, this has the net effect of potentially making the whole litigation process longer - rather than shorter as intended by the arbitration concept. Businesses and individuals have to seriously consider the practical effect of these arbitration provisions when signing a contract.